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STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. CHRISTIE MIKOLINSKI
(SC 16275)

Borden, Norcott, Katz, Palmer and Zarella, Js.
Argued March 16—officially released July 3, 2001

Counsel
Jeffrey D. Brownstein, with whom, on the brief, was
Gregory A. Thompson, for the appellant (defendant).

Eileen McCarthy Geel, assistant state’s attorney, for
the appellee (state).

Opinion

ZARELLA, J. The issue raised in this certified appeal is whether a sobriety checkpoint established for the
purpose of detecting violations of General Statutes
(Rev. to 1997) § 14-227a (a)1 violates the provisions of
article first, §§ 72 or 9,3 of the constitution of Connecticut.
The defendant, Christie Mikolinski, was charged
with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence
of intoxicating liquor in violation of § 14-227a.
Before her trial to the court commenced, the defendant
filed a motion to dismiss the information and a motion
to suppress, claiming that the checkpoint at which she
was stopped violated her rights under the Connecticut
constitution. The trial court denied those motions.
Accordingly, the evidence gathered as a result of the
stop of the defendant at the checkpoint was introduced
against her at her ensuing trial. Following her conviction,
the defendant appealed to the Appellate Court,
which affirmed the judgment of the trial court; State v.
Mikolinski, 56 Conn. App. 252, 262, 742 A.2d 1264
(1999); and, on the granting of certification,4 the defendant
appealed to this court.
The defendant claims that the Appellate Court
improperly upheld the trial court’s determination that
the sobriety checkpoint instituted by the town of Southington
did not violate her rights under article first, §§ 7
and 9, of our state constitution. We disagree and,
accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.
The following facts, as stated by the Appellate Court,
are relevant to this appeal. ‘‘Between 11 p.m. on May
23, 1997, and 3 a.m. on May 24, 1997, the Southington
police department conducted a sobriety checkpoint of
eastbound and westbound traffic in the area of 1199
Meriden-Waterbury Turnpike. Signs were posted in
each direction alerting motorists to the checkpoint, and
routes exiting the turnpike were available to motorists
in each direction who chose not to enter the checkpoint.
‘‘On May 24, 1997, at approximately 1:35 a.m., the
[defendant] entered the checkpoint and stopped her
vehicle. While the [defendant] was stopped, a police
officer asked her a number of questions. . . . After the
defendant admitted that she had been drinking alcohol,
the officer directed [her] to an adjacent parking lot
where a second officer conducted a detailed investigation.
Upon approaching the [defendant’s] vehicle, the
second officer smelled a strong odor of alcohol on the
[defendant’s] breath and noticed that her eyes were red
and glassy. He administered several sobriety tests, all
of which the [defendant] failed. The second officer then
placed her under arrest for operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of [intoxicating] liquor in
violation of . . . § 14-227a.’’ (Citation omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. Mikolinski, supra,
56 Conn. App. 254. Additional facts will be set forth
as required.
The state does not dispute the fact that the initial
stop of the defendant at the checkpoint constituted
a seizure.5 The state argues as a preliminary matter,
however, that, because the defendant voluntarily
entered the checkpoint, she cannot now claim that the
seizure was unreasonable. Cf. State v. Cobb, 251 Conn.
285, 314–16, 743 A.2d 1 (1999), cert. denied, U.S.
, 121 S. Ct. 106, 148 L. Ed. 2d 64 (2000). We need
not decide whether the defendant voluntarily entered
the checkpoint, however, because, even if we assume,
arguendo, that this was not the case, she cannot prevail
on her claim.
I
We first address the defendant’s claim that Southington’s
sobriety checkpoint violated her rights under
article first, § 7.6 In Michigan Dept. of State Police v.
Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412
(1990), the United States Supreme Court held that the
use of highway sobriety checkpoints, such as the one
at issue in this appeal, is not prohibited under the fourth
and fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution.
See id., 455. We are not persuaded that article
first, § 7, imposes greater restrictions upon the use of
such checkpoints than that imposed by the fourth and
fourteenth amendments to the United States constitution
as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court
in Sitz.
‘‘It is well settled that we are not bound by the decisions
of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting
the contours of article first, [§ 7] . . . [and] that federal
constitutional . . . law establishes a minimum
national standard for the exercise of individual rights
and does not inhibit state governments from affording
higher levels of protection for such rights.’’ (Citation
omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilkins,
240 Conn. 489, 504, 692 A.2d 1233 (1997). ‘‘Moreover,
we have held that [i]n the area of fundamental
civil liberties—which includes all protections of the
declaration of rights contained in article first of the
Connecticut constitution—we sit as a court of last
resort . . . . In such constitutional adjudication, our
first referent is Connecticut law and the full panoply
of rights Connecticut citizens have come to expect as
their due. Accordingly, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court defining fundamental rights are persuasive
authority to be afforded respectful consideration,
but they are to be followed by Connecticut courts only
when they provide no less individual protection than
is guaranteed by Connecticut law. . . . [W]e have concluded
in several cases that the state constitution provides
broader protection of individual rights than does
the federal constitution.’’7 (Citations omitted; internal
quotation marks omitted.) State v. DeFusco, 224 Conn.
627, 632, 620 A.2d 746 (1993).
In determining whether the protections secured by
article first, § 7, extend beyond those secured by the
fourth amendment to the United States constitution,
we consider several factors: (1) the text of the constitutional
provision; (2) holdings and dicta of Connecticut
appellate courts; (3) federal precedent; (4) sister state
decisions; (5) historical aspects, including the historical
constitutional setting and the debates of the framers;
and (6) economic and sociological or policy considerations.
E.g., State v. Geisler, 222 Conn. 672, 685, 610 A.2d
1225 (1992).
Our review of the text and history of article first, § 7,
reveals nothing to indicate that it forbids the use of
sobriety checkpoints. ‘‘The declaration of rights
adopted in 1818 appears to have its antecedents in the
Mississippi constitution of 1817, which in turn derived
from the federal bill of rights and the Virginia declaration
of rights of 1776. . . . The search and seizure provision
in our 1818 constitution, then article first, § 8,
closely resembles the fourth amendment to the United
States constitution. Although its enumeration was
changed to article first, § 7, when the 1965 constitution
incorporated article first, § 4, into article seventh, its
language has not been altered since its original adoption.’’
(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
State v. Diaz, 226 Conn. 514, 533, 628 A.2d 567
(1993). The language of article first, § 7, which was
based upon the fourth amendment, was adopted with
little debate. See Moore v. Ganim, 233 Conn. 557, 600,
660 A.2d 742 (1995). Thus, the circumstances surrounding
the adoption of article first, § 7, lend weight
to the view that, in most cases, a practice permitted
under the fourth amendment is permissible under article
first, § 7.
We have stated that ‘‘[t]here can be no ready test
for determining [the] reasonableness [of a search or
seizure] other than by balancing the need to search [or
seize] against the invasion which the search [or seizure]
entails. . . . We judge the permissibility of a particular
law enforcement practice by balancing its intrusion on
the individual’s interests against its promotion of legitimate
state governmental interests, and examine the
intrusion to determine whether it is the minimum search
necessary under the circumstances.’’ (Citation omitted;
internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Wilkins,
supra, 240 Conn. 503; see also State v. Januszewski,
182 Conn. 142, 148–49, 438 A.2d 679 (1980), cert. denied,
453 U.S. 922, 101 S. Ct. 3159, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1005 (1981).
In Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, supra, 496
U.S. 444, the court used the similar balancing test set
forth in Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 99 S. Ct. 2637, 61
L. Ed. 2d 357 (1979), and United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 96 S. Ct. 3074, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1116
(1976), to weigh ‘‘the state’s interest in preventing accidents
caused by drunk drivers, the effectiveness of
sobriety checkpoints in achieving that goal, and the
level of intrusion on an individual’s privacy caused by
the checkpoints.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, supra, 449. The
court held that the sobriety checkpoint in that case was
consistent with the fourth amendment, reasoning that
‘‘the balance of the State’s interest in preventing
drunken driving, the extent to which this system can
reasonably be said to advance that interest, and the
degree of intrusion upon individual motorists who are
briefly stopped, [weigh] in favor of the state program.’’
Id., 455. We conclude that this balancing test, which
is consistent with our precedent, provides the proper
means by which to assess the validity of sobriety checkpoints
under article first, § 7.
In applying this balancing test to the sobriety checkpoint
at issue in the present appeal, the defendant does
not dispute that the state has a significant interest in
preventing motorists from driving while under the influence
of alcohol. As the United States Supreme Court
noted in Sitz, ‘‘[n]o one can seriously dispute the magnitude
of the drunken driving problem or the States’ interest
in eradicating it.’’ Id., 451.8
Against this interest, we balance the level of intrusion
on the individual’s privacy caused by a checkpoint.
Although sobriety checkpoints may cause motorists a
slight inconvenience, we conclude that, when sobriety
checkpoints are operated properly, the intrusion on
an individual’s privacy is minimal. See id., 451 (‘‘the
measure of the intrusion on motorists stopped briefly
at sobriety checkpoints . . . is slight’’).
The balancing test also requires an evaluation of ‘‘the
degree to which the seizure advances the public interest
. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
omitted.) Id., 454. We agree with the United States
Supreme Court that this inquiry is ‘‘not meant to transfer
from politically accountable officials to the courts the
decision as to which among reasonable alternative law
enforcement techniques should be employed to deal
with a serious public danger.’’ Id., 453. Rather, ‘‘the
choice among such reasonable alternatives remains
with the governmental officials who have a unique
understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public
resources, including a finite number of police officers.’’
Id., 453–54. We conclude that sobriety checkpoints further
the public interest in reducing the number of alcohol
related automobile accidents and resulting injuries,
fatalities, and costs associated therewith.
The defendant, relying on principles outlined in Terry
v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889
(1968), argues that the officers operating the checkpoint
were required to have a reasonable and articulable suspicion
that the defendant was engaged in criminal activity
before they detained her at the checkpoint. We are
not persuaded by this argument.
It is true that ‘‘[a]pplications of Terry principles in
the context of motor vehicle stops are . . . embodied
in our state constitution. See, e.g., State v. Torres, 230
Conn. 372, 382–83, 645 A.2d 529 (1994) (reasonable
articulable suspicion standard); State v. Lamme, [216
Conn. 172, 184, 579 A.2d 484 (1990)] (principles of Terry
define when detention is clearly warranted by law under
article first, § 9, of state constitution); State v. Dukes,
[209 Conn. 98, 122, 547 A.2d 10 (1988)] (state constitution
permits police to require occupants to step out of
lawfully stopped motor vehicle); State v. Anderson, [24
Conn. App. 438, 441, 589 A.2d 374, cert. denied, 219
Conn. 903, 593 A.2d 130 (1991)] (state and federal constitutions
permit brief investigatory stops based on reasonable
and articulable suspicion).’’ State v. Wilkins,
supra, 240 Conn. 508–509. None of the foregoing cases,
however, involved stops made pursuant to neutral criteria.
Rather, in each of the cases, the motorist was singled
out by law enforcement officers based upon the officers’
reasonable and articulable suspicion. The Terry standard,
which is predicated upon police discretion, simply
is incompatible with a sobriety checkpoint at which an
officer’s discretion as to which cars to stop is eliminated
by requiring the officer to stop all cars, or stop
cars pursuant to other neutral criteria. As the court
remarked in Brown v. Texas, supra, 443 U.S. 47, ‘‘[a]
central concern in balancing [the public interest in law
enforcement with individual liberty] . . . has been to
assure that an individual’s reasonable expectation of
privacy is not subject to arbitrary invasions solely at
the unfettered discretion of officers in the field.’’ Id.,
51.Weconclude that, just as the Terry standard protects
an individual’s freedom from arbitrary police conduct
by requiring that a seizure ‘‘be based on specific, objective
facts indicating that society’s legitimate interests
require the seizure of the particular individual’’; id.; so
does the requirement ‘‘that the seizure must be carried
out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations
on the conduct of individual officers.’’ Id.
The defendant argues that the checkpoint at issue in
this case was not operated pursuant to a plan embodying
neutral criteria that limited officers’ discretion as
to how individual drivers were to be treated. On the
contrary, we agree with the trial court that the plan9
implemented by Southington police embodied neutral
criteria in that it restricted officers’ discretion as to
which cars to stop and provided that all drivers were
to be treated uniformly during the initial stop. The plan
instructed officers to stop all cars and provided officers
with three questions that they were to ask all drivers.
If, after this initial encounter, an officer had reason
to believe that the driver was driving while under the
influence, the plan instructed the officer to direct the
driver to a safe, off-street location, where another officer
was to administer sobriety tests. The trial court
found that the checkpoint was implemented ‘‘almost to
the letter’’ of the operational plan.
Our conclusion that sobriety checkpoints operated
pursuant to neutral criteria are permissible under article
first, § 7, is in accord with the decisions of sister state
courts upholding the implementation of sobriety checkpoints
under their respective state constitutions. E.g.,
Hagood v. Town Creek, 628 So. 2d 1057, 1062 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1993); Mullinax v. State, 327 Ark. 41, 47, 938 S.W.2d
801 (1997); Ingersoll v. Palmer, 43 Cal. 3d 1321, 1325,
743 P.2d 1299, 241 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1987); People v. Rister,
803 P.2d 483, 490–91 (Colo. 1990); State v. Loyd, 530
N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995); Little v. State, 300 Md.
485, 504, 479 A.2d 903 (1984); State v. Welch, 755 S.W.2d
624, 632–33 (Mo. App. 1988); Bismarck v. Uhden, 513
N.W.2d 373, 378–79 (N.D. 1994); State v. Bauer, 99 Ohio
App. 3d 505, 513–14, 651 N.E.2d 46 (1994); Commonwealth
v. Blouse, 531 Pa. 167, 173–74, 611 A.2d 1177
(1992); State v. Downey, 945 S.W.2d 102, 104 (Tenn.
1997); Carte v. Cline, 194 W. Va. 233, 238, 460 S.E.2d
48 (1995).
II
The defendant next argues that the sobriety checkpoint
violated her rights under article first, § 9. We
disagree.
Article first, § 9, provides: ‘‘No person shall be
arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly
warranted by law.’’ ‘‘[W]e have generally characterized
article first, § 9, as one of our state constitutional provisions
guaranteeing due process of law. See, e.g., State
v. Marra, 195 Conn. 421, 425, 489 A.2d 350 (1985); State
v. Castonguay, 194 Conn. 416, 420, 481 A.2d 56 (1984);
Parks v. Bourbeau, 193 Conn. 270, 278 n.8, 477 A.2d
636 (1984).’’ State v. Lamme, 216 Conn. 172, 177, 579
A.2d 484 (1990).
In Lamme, the defendant challenged the administration
of roadside sobriety tests after having been stopped
for a motor vehicle infraction. See id., 174. The defendant
argued that article first, § 9, prohibits a police
officer from detaining an individual unless the officer
has probable cause to make an arrest. Id., 176. We
rejected this argument, concluding that ‘‘the specific
content appropriately to be assigned to the phrase
‘clearly warranted by law’ depends on the particular
liberty interest that is at stake.’’ Id., 178. We stated
that ‘‘[t]he historical roots of ‘except in cases clearly
warranted by law’ appear . . . to provide protection
for personal freedom through a blend of statutory and
constitutional rights that, like the text of . . . article
first, § 9, incorporates no single constitutional standard.’’
Id., 179. We held that ‘‘the principles underlying
constitutionally permissible Terry stops . . . define
when detentions are ‘clearly warranted by law’ under
article first, § 9.’’ (Citations omitted.) Id., 184. We then
‘‘balanc[ed] the need to search [or seize] against the
invasion which the search [or seizure] entails.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392
U.S. 21. ‘‘[In] [b]alancing the circumscribed nature of a
Terry stop intrusion against the serious risks of criminal
behavior, especially in the context of the risks associated
with driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor, we [concluded] that the defendant’s brief
detention [by police in order to administer the roadside
sobriety tests] did not violate his due process rights.’’
State v. Lamme, supra, 216 Conn. 184.
Thus, in defining the contours of article first, § 9, our
first task is to identify the particular liberty interest at
stake. In the present case, as in Lamme, the protected
liberty interest is the individual’s right to be free from
unreasonable police detention while driving a car.
Because of the similarity of the liberty interest in the
present case with that in Lamme, we conclude that the
balancing test that was applied in Lamme appropriately
guides our analysis of the defendant’s claim. See id.
In the present case, the defendant does not dispute
that ‘‘[t]he state has a vital interest in keeping intoxicated
drivers off the roads and highways’’; State v.
Lamme, 19 Conn. App. 594, 599, 563 A.2d 1372 (1989),
aff’d, 216 Conn. 172, 579 A.2d 484 (1990); and we have
concluded in our discussion of article first, § 7; see part
I of this opinion; that this vital interest outweighs the
intrusiveness of the checkpoint.
The defendant claims that her right to due process
under article first, § 9, was violated ‘‘because [a sobriety
checkpoint] permitting ‘suspicionless’ seizures [is] not
expressly authorized by any statutory or administrative
scheme and is not police activity that was authorized
under common law.’’ Nothing in the text or the history
of article first, § 9, however, requires common-law, statutory
or administrative authorization to conduct an
investigatory stop of a motorist. In State v. Lamme,
supra, 216 Conn. 185, we concluded, as a matter of
state constitutional law, that Terry stops, which are not
authorized by any statute or regulation, are permissible
under article first, § 9. We stated that ‘‘[o]ur appraisal
of the due process contours of article first, § 9, leads
us to conclude that the principles of fundamental fairness
that are the hallmark of due process permit a brief
investigatory detention, even in the absence of probable
cause, if the police have a reasonable and articulable
suspicion that a person has committed or is about to
commit a crime.’’ Id., 184. In light of the balance of
interests in the present appeal, we are persuaded that
a brief investigatory detention at a sobriety checkpoint
that is planned and operated pursuant to neutral criteria
is consistent with the due process provisions of article
first, § 9.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other justices concurred.
1 General Statutes (Rev. to 1997) § 14-227a (a) provides: ‘‘No person shall
operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
any drug or both. A person commits the offense of operating a motor vehicle
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both if he
operates a motor vehicle on a public highway of this state or on any road
of a district organized under the provisions of chapter 105, a purpose of
which is the construction and maintenance of roads and sidewalks, or on
any private road on which a speed limit has been established in accordance
with the provisions of section 14-218a, or in any parking area for ten or
more cars or on any school property (1) while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor or any drug or both or (2) while the ratio of alcohol in the
blood of such person is ten-hundredths of one per cent or more of alcohol,
by weight.’’
2 Article first, § 7, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: ‘‘The people
shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable
searches or seizures; and no warrant to search any place, or to
seize any person or things, shall issue without describing them as nearly
as may be, nor without probable cause supported by oath or affirmation.’’
3 Article first, § 9, of the constitution of Connecticut provides: ‘‘No person
shall be arrested, detained or punished, except in cases clearly warranted
by law.’’
4 We granted certification to appeal limited to the following issue: ‘‘Did
the Appellate Court properly conclude that the defendant’s detention at a
roadside sobriety checkpoint did not violate her rights under either article
first, § 7, or article first, § 9, of the Connecticut constitution?’’ State v.
Mikolinski, 252 Conn. 950, 748 A.2d 299 (2000).
5 Although the trial court did not find that the defendant had been seized
at the checkpoint, we note that the detention of motorists at a checkpoint
is a seizure under the United States constitution. Michigan Dept. of State
Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 110 L. Ed. 2d 412 (1990)
(‘‘a Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a
checkpoint’’).
6 The defendant does not challenge the legality of the sobriety testing that
occurred after one of the officers at the checkpoint noticed that she had
exhibited signs of intoxication.
7 E.g., State v. Miller, 227 Conn. 363, 386–87, 630 A.2d 1315 (1993) (warrantless
search of automobile after police impoundment prohibited under
article first, § 7); State v. Marsala, 216 Conn. 150, 171, 579 A.2d 58 (1990)
(rejecting good faith exception to exclusionary rule under article first, § 7).
8 A National Highway Traffic Safety Administration report estimates that,
in Connecticut, in 1998 alone, 6000 automobile accidents involved alcohol,
resulting in 142 fatalities. The report also estimates that the average cost
per mile driven of an accident involving a driver with a blood alcohol level
of 0.10 or more is $5.20 per mile driven, as compared to ten cents per mile
driven for an accident involving a driver with a blood alcohol level of 0.00.
In short, ‘‘[w]e . . . recognize that a drunken driver is like a ticking time
bomb.’’ Shore v. Stonington, 187 Conn. 147, 162, 444 A.2d 1379 (1982) (Peters,
J., dissenting).
9 The plan provided in relevant part: ‘‘On May 23, 1997 the Southington
Police Department, will be conducting a Sobriety Checkpoint, for enforcement
of Connecticut General Statute[s] § 14-227a Operation while under
the influence of liquor or drug or while impaired by liquor. The sobriety
checkpoint will be conducted on Meriden Waterbury Turnpike State of
Connecticut route [number] 322, starting at 2300 hours on [May 23, 1997],
and ending at 0300 hours on May 24, 1997.
‘‘SOBRIETY CHECKPOINT LOCATION: In the area of 1199 Meriden Waterbury
Turnpike.
‘‘SET UP CHECKPOINT: The checkpoint will monitor both east and westbound
traffic for Meriden Waterbury Turnpike. The checkpoint requires
that every eastbound and westbound motor vehicle on Meriden Waterbury
Turnpike be stopped. Two police officers will be assigned to traffic duty.
Three police officers will be assigned as testing officers. There will be a
processing officer who is assigned to Police headquarters and he will test
all arrested subjects on the Intoxilyzer 5000.
‘‘There will be signs set up prior to the checkpoint which will allow both
eastbound and westbound traffic to turn around if they do not wish to travel
through the checkpoint itself. If a vehicle turns around to avoid traveling
through the checkpoint it will not be stopped by any officer assigned to the
checkpoint. A vehicle that attempts to avoid the checkpoint, and during
such avoidance operates in a reckless manner, an officer will attempt to
stop this vehicle for general public safety. The officer will speak with the
operator about his or her operation, and take the enforcement action necessary.
‘‘DESIGNATED TESTING AREA: Eastbound and westbound operators
will be tested in the parking area of 1199 Meriden Waterbury Turnpike,
which is a medium size plaza. This parking area has a covered side walk
section and is flat.
‘‘Sergeant William P. PALMIERI of the Southington Police Department
will be the checkpoint supervisor.
‘‘DUTIES AND ASSIGNMENTS OF OFFICERS:
‘‘TRAFFIC OFFICERS: One officer will be assigned to eastbound traffic
on Meriden Waterbury Turnpike. One officer will be assigned to westbound
traffic on Meriden Waterbury Turnpike. Both traffic officers will stop their
respective vehicles. The officers will introduce themselves explaining the
nature of the sobriety checkpoint. The traffic officers will then ask three
standard questions.
‘‘1. Where are you coming from?
‘‘2. Have you had anything to drink tonight?
‘‘3. How much did you drink? (this would only be asked if the person
stated they had consumed an alcoholic beverage).
‘‘During this interview the traffic officers would be looking for clues which
would indicate that the operator was under the influence such as slurred
speech, smell of alcoholic beverage on breath, glassy eyes etc. If they
detected the operator was possibly under the influence they would instruct
the operator of the vehicle to pull into the designated testing area. At this
point one of the testing officers would take over. If there is no detection
of the operator being under the influence the officer will allow the operator
to continue on their way.
‘‘TESTING OFFICERS: These officers will conduct all field sobriety tests.
The testing officers will administer the following field sobriety tests, in the
same order as listed herein:
‘‘1. The horizontal gaze nystagmus.
‘‘2. The walk and turn.
‘‘3. The one leg stand.
‘‘If a testing officer has probable cause to believe the subject is intoxicated
he/she will then place the subject under arrest, and transport them to Police
Headquarters. If probable cause does not exist for the arrest of the tested
subject they will be allowed to exit the testing area.
‘‘TRANSPORT OFFICER: Will be any available officer. This officer will
bring the subject to Police Headquarters and turn the subject over to the
processing officer.
‘‘PROCESSING OFFICER: Will be Officer DOERFLER and he will process
all necessary paper work and test all subjects on the Intoxilyzer 5000.
‘‘ALTERNATIVE CHECKPOINT ROUTE: Putnam Place will allow eastbound
vehicles an alternative route other than traveling through the checkpoint.
Birch Drive will allow westbound vehicles an alterative route other
than traveling through the checkpoint. There will be signs posted prior to
these streets warning SOBRIETY CHECKPOINT AHEAD. The Putnam Place
warning sign was located approximately [one] tenth of [one] mile west of
the checkpoint. The [B]irch Drive warning sign was located approximately
[one] and one half tenths of [one] mile east of the checkpoint.
‘‘This operational Plan will allow for changes should the need arise, any
changes to this plan will be made by [Sergeant Palmieri], and all officers
working the checkpoint will be advised. [Sergeant Palmieri] will then prepare
a supplemental case report as to what the change was and why it was
needed.’’